

## Message Text

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20

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ADP-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00

USIE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01

PRS-01 SS-15 IO-12 DPW-01 RSR-01 OMB-01 GAC-01 INRE-00

/120 W

----- 099961

O R 181030 Z APR 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3659

DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMCONSUL UDORN

USDEL JEC PARIS

USIA WASHDC

SECDEF

USDAO SAIGON

DIRNSA FT GG MEADE MD

CINCPAC

CINCUSARPAC HAWAII

COMUSMACTHAI

DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

CDR USSAG NKP

CDR 13 AF ADVON UDORN

DODSPECREP BANGKOK

DODSPECREP NKP

CHSPECACTS BANGKOK

7 ACCS KORAT

56 SOW NKP

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432 TRW UDORN

CDR JCRC NKP

8 TFW UBON  
ARMA/ AIRA VTN LAOS  
ARMA/ AIRA SVKT LAOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L VIENTIANE 2982

E. O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, PINT, PFOR, LA  
SUBJECT: LAO SITUATION REPORT- APRIL 18

CINCPAC FOR POLAD; 13 AF ADVON, 432 TRW, 56 SOW AND 8 TFW  
FOR DO/ DI; MACTHAI FOR J2 AND PAO

REF: VIENTIANE 2954

BEGIN SUMMARY: MILITARY- MILITARY ACTIVITY DECREASED  
MARKEDLY THROUGHOUT LAOS UDING PERIOD 16-17 APRIL, WITH  
ONLY TWO INCIDENTS REPORTED, BOTH IN MR IV. RLAF FLEW  
ONLY TWO T-28 AND FOUR AC-47 GUNSHIP SORTIES. POLITICAL-  
XAT LAO REPORTED PENTAGON ANNOUNCEMENT OF USAF BOMBING IN  
LAOS. XAT LAO ALSO REPORTED THAT INTERNAL TALKS REMAIN  
BOGGED DOWN. END SUMMARY.

1. SECTION I- CEASE FIRE OBSERVANCE

A. MR I: NO GROUND OR AIR YS EARLIER ( ANKARA 2914).  
EVEN ASSUMING AN IMPASSE COULD BE AVOIDED, HE EXPRESSED  
STRONG DOUBTS THAT A SOLUTION COULD BE NEGOTIATED IN 1973.  
HE NEVERTHELESS SAID THAT INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS SHOULD CONTINUE.  
QUOTE WE SHOULD BE PATIENT. UNQUOTE.

2. WHEN GRANT TAXED BARUTCU WITH THE HARDENING POSITION  
DENKTASH HAD BEEN PROJECTING, AND HIS BACKING AWAY FROM  
PREVIOUSLY AGREED UNDERSTANDINGS, DRAWING ON NICOSIA 855  
IN DETAIL, BARUTCU DID NOT BOTHER WITH DENIALS; BARUTCU DID,  
HOWEVER, SAY THAT IT WAS NOW APPROPRIATE IN BARGAINING CONTEXT  
FOR THE TURKS TO LISTEN TO THE GREEK- CYPRUS VIEWPOINT,  
AND THUS IMPLIED THAT THERE WAS AT LEAST IN THEORY  
SOME ROOM FOR COMPROMISE.

3. ADMITTING THAT THERE WERE DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF  
CERTAIN KEY TERMS, BARUTCU NEVERTHELESS SAID THA TURK  
NEGOTIATORS HAD ALWAYS MADE CLEAR THEY EXPECTED LOCAL  
" AUTONOMY", NOT LOCAL " ADMINISTRATION". ( COMPARE WITH  
BAYULKEN' S EXPLICIT STATEMENT TO CONTRARY.)

4. WHEN WE RAISED GRIVAS PROBLEM AND MAKARIOS' APRIL 15  
CHALLENGE TO HIM, BARUTCU INTERJECTED THAT HE WAS VERY  
UNHAPPY WITH THE MAKARIOS STATEMENTS AT THE MONUMENT UNVEILING  
CEREMONY IN WHICH HE REFERRED TO THE STILL CONTINUING NATIONAL  
STRUGGLE AGAINST THE TURK CYPRIOT REBELLION ( NICOSIA 884).  
HE SAID THESE REMARKS COULD CONSTITUTE A GREEN LIGHT TO ATTACK  
TURK COMMUNITY. DEVELOPING THIS THEME, BARUTCU SAID THAT GOT  
MINUTE BY MINUTE ASSESSED THREATS TO TURKISH COMMUNITY FROM VAR-  
IOUS QUARTERS. TURKS HAD CONCLUDED THAT GRIVAS FORCES WERE HIGHLY

UNLIKELY TO ATTACK TURKS, WHICH WOULD COMPLETELY DESTROY GRIVAS' HOPES FOR ENOSIS. TURKS HAD, HOWEVER, DECIDED THAT THERE WAS NOW A SERIOUS POTENTIAL THREAT FROM CERTAIN OF MAKARIOS' ALLIES (I. E., LISSARIDES). BARUTCU SAID HE THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE THAT MAKARIOS, BY ENCOURAGING THE MATERIALIZATION OF THIS THREAT, IN EFFECT MIGHT WANT THE TURKS TO TAKE CARE OF THE GRIVAS PROBLEM  
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FOR HIM. BARUTCU WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE KNEW MAKARIOS WAS BOTH WEAKENED AND WORRIED; BY WAY OF PROOF, HE CLAIMED THAT MAKARIOS LAST YEAR HAD TRIED TO CONSULT WITH THE TURKS, BUT THE TURKS HAD REJECTED THE OVERTURES. (BARUTCU REFUSED TO GO FURTHER THAN THIS AND EXPLAIN DETAILS.)

5. GRANT OUTLINED WAYS IN WHICH HE THOUGHT GRIVAS- INSPIRED VIOLENCE AND HIS PRESENCE ON ISLAND DIMMED HOPES FOR SUITABLE INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT AND ALSO HELD PROMISE OF HARM TO ATHENS-ANKARA RELATIONSHIP. BARUTCU AGREED THESE POINTS WERE SOUND ONES, BUT HE SUMMED UP TURK POSITION AS PREFERRING TO SEE A WEAKENED ARCHBISHOP AND A GREEK- CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IN SOME DISARRAY EVEN IF THIS MEANT THAT THE ARCHBISHOP COULD MAKE NO MEANINGFUL CONCESSIONS IN THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, AND HE ASSUMED THAT IT DID.

6. BARUTCU MADE CLEAR THAT TURKS HAD NOT ASKED GOG TO GET GRIVAS UNDER CONTROL. FROM TURK NATIONAL POINT OF VIEW, CONTROLLING GRIVAS WAS NOT ESSENTIAL UNLESS, OF COURSE, A SETTLEMENT WAS ABOUT TO BE REACHED; IN THAT CASE, GRIVAS WOULD HAVE TO BE NEUTRALIZED, IN ANY EVENT, BARUTCU ADDED, FOR THE PRESENT IT WAS NOT UP TO THE TURKS TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT GRIVAS. HE EXPRESSED, HOWEVER, SOME ANNOYANCE THAT THE GOG, APPARENTLY LOOKING AT PROBLEM FROM ITS OWN NATIONAL INTEREST, OR BECAUSE IT HAD WIDER PLOT IN MIND, HAD SO FAR CHOSEN TO DO VERY LITTLE, AND HE REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO PROBLEM COMMENCING JAN- FEB. (BARUTCU INDICATED AN ARGUMENT COULD BE MADE THAT GOG INACTION DID NOT SERVE ITS LONG RANGE INTERESTS.)

7. (GREEK EMBASSY COUNSELOR MALYVIATIS, IN EARLIER TALK WITH US THAT DAY, HAD CONFIRMED THAT TURKS HAD MADE NO APPROACHES TO GOG ABOUT GRIVAS; MOREOVER, HE ARGUED THAT GOG RELATIONS WITH GOG DID NOT REQUIRE THAT GOG MOVE AGAINST GRIVAS, ALTHOUGH HE EXPRESSED PERSONAL AGREEMENT WITH VIEW THAT GRIVAS ACTIVITIES COULD ULTIMATELY HARM ATHENS' INTERESTS.)

8. BARUTCU INDICATED THAT TURKS WERE NEGATIVE ABOUT MAKARIOS' PLANS FOR AUXILIARY POLICE BUT, IN THE END, IN A FORM OF RETALIATION WOULD PROBABLY CARRY OUT A TOKEN EXPANSION (50 TO 100 MEN) OF THE TURKISH POLICE FORCE. HE ALSO EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT MAKARIOS IN ENLISTING ADDITIONAL POLICE COULD MATCH THE EXPANSION OF GRIVAS' FORCES IN THE MEANTIME (WHICH HE ESTIMATED NOW AT MORE THAN ONE THOUSAND AND POSSIBLY AS MANY AS TWO THOUSAND MEN).  
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TO PREVENT INFILTRATION OF POLICE BY GRIVAS' SUPPORTERS,  
MAKARIOS MIGHT HAVE TO ENLIST THE COMMUNISTS.

9. TURNING TO REPORTS OF RESIGNATION OF CLERIDES, BARUTCU  
SAID TURK EMBASSY IN NICOSIA WAS INCLINED TO BELIEVE THEM.  
BARUTCU ASKED WHETHER GRANT THOUGHT M-72 PROBLEM WAS ON WAY  
TO SOLUTION, AND APPEARED RELIEVED BY ANSWER THAT PROSPECTS  
ARE HOPEFUL. HE AGREED RESOLUTION IMPORTANT BEFORE JUNE  
MEETING UNSC.

10. BARUTCU RAISED POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING TURKISH WATER TO  
CYPRUS, BUT SUGGESTED INTERNATIONAL FINANCING AND SAID GOT NOT  
PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE PROJECT ON ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY. ALSO  
SAID FLATLY GOT WOULD CUT OFF WATER IF GOC TRIED ENOSIS.

11. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION, BARUTCU  
THREW OUT SUSPICIONS OF GREEK PLOTTING, BY ATHENS AS WELL  
AS BY MAKARIOS. USUALLY BARUTCU DOES NOT SPOUT THE  
STANDARD TURKISH THEOLOGY ABOUT THE GREEKS. SIMILARLY,  
FOR THE FIRST TIME, HE THREW COLD WATER OVER HIS EARLIER  
EXPRESSED OPINIONS THAT AN INTERCOMMUNAL SETTLEMENT WITH  
A REVISED CONSTITUTION COULD BE MADE TO WORK, ASSUMING  
GOT- GOG COOPERATION. THE OVERALL IMPRESSION HE CONVEYED  
IS THAT TURKEY IS PREPARED TO ROCK ALONO FOR THE TIME BEING  
WITH STATUS QUO, ACCEPTING THE PROSPECT OF NO REAL PROGRESS  
IN INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.  
HANDLEY

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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**TAGS:** MOPS, PFOR, PINS, PINT, LA  
**To:** STATE  
DIA  
CIA INFO BANGKOK  
JAKARTA  
MOSCOW  
PARIS  
PHNOM PENH

SAIGON  
OTTAWA  
WARSAW  
NEW DELHI  
UDORN  
JEC PARIS  
USIA  
SECDEF  
USDAO SAIGON  
DIRNSA FT GG MEADE MD  
CINCPAC  
CINCUSARPAC HAWAII  
COMUSMACTHAI  
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI  
CDR USSAG NKP  
CDR AF F ADVON UDORN  
DODSPECREP BANGKOK  
DODSPECREP NKP  
CHSPECACTS BANGKOK  
ACCS KORAT  
SOW NKP  
TRW W UDORN  
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TFW UBON  
ARMA AIRA A VTN LAOS  
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